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THE UNITED NATIONS AT FIFTY
Nicholas Rostow*
Our first order of business is to congratulate the United Nations on reaching
its fiftieth birthday. In fact, since the United Nations came into being in 1942
as the alliance against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, we are celebrating the
fiftieth anniversary of the U.N. Charter. Its predecessor lived only twenty-six
years and, in reality, fewer than that.
The purpose is not just celebratory, rather, it is to examine the role of the
United Nations in its first fifty years and the prospects for its second fifty. The
U.N. Charter itself provides our theme: international peace and security as the
necessary condition for social progress.
I
Just as the Cold War defined most of our lives, so it defined the United
Nations' first fifty years. For us, the Cold War dictated our assumptions about
international politics, America's role in the world, and America's interests.
Because of the Cold War, we established for the first time in our history a
peacetime network of defensive alliances, maintained an enormous standing,
peacetime military establishment, and developed extraordinary intelligence
capabilities. Cold War threats influenced internal affairs as well - the
development and maintenance of what has been called, exaggeratedly, the
national security state. Even at the height of the controversies over Korea and
Vietnam, most Americans shared a conviction about who wore the white hats
and who wore the black hats in the international arena and the need for
international leadership by the United States. Now, Cold War assumptions and
perspectives have dissipated. Today, we are searching for new understanding
and new certainty concerning international affairs.
During this same period, the United Nations was giving meaning to its
Charter through practice. The frequent generalization that the Cold War
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paralyzed the United Nations and prevented it from fulfilling its potential is too
sweeping. From the Berlin airlift to the war in Afghanistan, of course, the U.N.
Security Council too often was too divided to discharge its primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security. Yet this fact did not
mean the United Nations was inactive.
The United Nations' first decade saw the development of international
cooperation in peacekeeping and nation-building from Korea to the Middle East
to the Congo. The actions were neither cost-free nor non-controversial and often
involved substantial violence. In spite of the costs, the United Nations as an
institution played a significant role.
During the Cold War, the United Nations also undertook or oversaw
substantial international humanitarian efforts. U.N. agencies were created to
alleviate the suffering of those driven from pillar to post by war and other
calamities of the twentieth century, and to encourage international cooperation
in areas as diverse as public health, environmental protection, and the safeguard-
ing of artifacts and natural formations. Secretary General Hammarskjold made
his office an independent voice, which most of his successors have used to the
world's advantage. One result has been a United Nations that has facilitated the
development of a truly global process, in which international law is created
through the efforts of all the actors in the world arena - states, individuals,
corporations, non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations.
At the same time - indeed throughout the Cold War - the United Nations
remained what it could not escape being: a political institution to which certain
powers and responsibilities had been delegated under the U.N. Charter. The
United Nations Organization is superimposed upon a functioning international
system of independent or nominally independent states. These states have
acquired habits of action, frames of reference, and conceptions of national
interest and international right and wrong over centuries of bitter experience. In
1945, these states did not intend to make a world government out of the United
Nations, and so far at least, the United Nations has not become one. Secretary
General Boutros-Ghali meant to refer to this reality when he wrote in his 1992
Agenda for Peace that the "foundation-stone" for the work of maintaining
international peace and security - peacekeeping, peacemaking, and
peacebuilding - is the independent state.
In building peace, the United Nations in some respects is more than the sum
of its parts. More than just a silent bureaucrat, the Secretary General enjoys a
Bully Pulpit. Mr. Boutros-Ghali has not hesitated to be a catalyst for interna-
tional action. His voice was extremely important in mobilizing the international
community into action with respect to Somalia's starving millions in 1992.
In addition, as Secretary General Hammarskjold showed long ago, the
United Nations Secretariat can play a helpful, mediating role in internal as well
as international conflict. In Cambodia, El Salvador, and numerous other
countries, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali has built on that example, sometimes
irritating world capitals in the process. These efforts are evidence that the
United Nations as an institution is acting on the first priority of the U.N. Charter,
to maintain international peace and security through effective measures of
collective security.
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However much initiative the Secretary General undertakes, he nevertheless
must act with the acquiescence, or at the behest, of individual states. U.N.
institutions - notably, the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the
International Court of Justice - occasionally exhibit capacities more frequently
associated with governments than with intergovernmental organizations. But,
they have not replaced individual Member initiative and action, particularly with
respect to matters of war and peace. Given some positions adopted over the
years by majorities of the General Assembly, this reality is hardly surprising.
In light of this fact, the United Nations is also less than the sum of its parts.
The most important provision of the U.N. Charter prohibits the international
threat or use of force. The Charter envisions two mechanisms for enforcing this
prohibition. One contemplates Security Council action, including the use of
military forces. In this scheme, the Security Council is the world's policeman.
The second involves actions by states exercising what the Charter calls the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense against an armed attack.
Both sides of the Iron Curtain argued that their actions complied with this
provision of the U.N. Charter. Only twice have military actions occurred
explicitly in a U.N. framework: the Korean and Persian Gulf Wars. While they
were undeniably U.N. operations in a U.N. context, they were not the kind of
action explicitly mentioned in the Charter. Rather, they were exercises of the
right of collective self-defense in a U.N. context.
The politico-military, economic, and cultural Cold War frequently
necessitated action outside the United Nations. Due to the Cold War, U.N.
Members did not share more than nominal adherence to common principles or
even a nominally common confidence that they could rely on others, particularly
a global institution of universal or near-universal membership, to protect their
security interests. Individual states were loathe to give up rights of self-defense,
including the right to judge when and if a threat or armed attack existed,
especially in times of substantial advances in military technologies.
The end of the Cold War has raised expectations for the United Nations'
role with respect to the maintenance of peace. It has also brought greater
uniformity of perspective to the international community. As a result, actions
that might have been taken before the end of the Cold War in the name of
collective self-defense now are taken in the name of collective security and U.N.
enforcement, even though U.N. armies do not exist. Almost three hundred
Security Council resolutions passed since the demise of the USSR in 1991 reflect
shared purposes. In the preceding forty-six years, the Council had passed only
678 resolutions. American ascendancy does not account for this productivity.
Rather, of supreme importance is the ostensible development of a common
Security Council viewpoint of its duties with respect to the maintenance of
international peace and security.
Elevated expectations generate greater than warranted disappointments when
they are not realized. The post-Cold War United Nations has produced its share
of disappointments already. The Somalia operation did not prove to be so
successful as was expected; indeed, it was widely regarded as a failure.
Widespread pessimism greeted the Haiti operation as well. U.N. operations in
the former Yugoslavia are calamitous. The United Nations remains doggedly
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neutral even when such neutrality assists those who contravene U.N. Charter
principles and commit aggression.
As we look ahead to the United Nations' second fifty years, caution is a
becoming posture. The rapid and profound changes of the last few years came
unexpectedly, even to those who had analyzed the Soviet Union and concluded
it could not survive forever. The past provides insight, but no sure guide. Who
can be confident, for example, that the nuclear peace will be kept for another
fifty years? Despite uncertainty, it is possible to evaluate some of the current
proposals for changing the United Nations and estimate the likelihood of their
becoming reality.
Probably the easiest to address is the question of Security Council
membership. The United States supports granting Permanent Member status to
Germany and Japan. The logic of power eventually will override the shadows
of history.
This change, however, will not be achieved quickly. Existing Permanent
Members fear such a change might lead to a complete overhaul of the Security
Council, including loss of their status. For a number of years, the non-aligned
have chafed at the Permanent Members' veto and argued that Security Council
Membership should reflect the demography of the United Nations. If these
issues are commingled with the question of Japan and Germany (or a European
seat if European integration advances in the foreign policy area), then Tokyo and
Bonn (or Berlin) had best be patient. In any event, it is unlikely that the existing
Permanent Five will relinquish their power voluntarily.
The second great issue concerns a potential U.N. armed force and
intelligence service - in short, infrastructure to support Mr. Boutros-Ghali's
agenda and to implement the Charter's visions. Almost fifty years after adoption
of the U.N. Charter, no country has executed a special agreement with the
Security Council to make available armed forces at the Council's call. While
one may argue that more time is needed to evaluate U.N. capabilities in the
military area and all the questions concerning the role of national military
contingents in Security Council operations, enough time has passed and enough
crises have been confronted since the end of the Cold War to see that confidence
in a U.N. shield is not high. Perhaps if the Yugoslav situation had been handled
otherwise, states would not be so reluctant to trust the United Nations to guard
their security. Already, the solidarity among the great powers of the immediate
post-Cold War period cannot be counted on. In addition, U.N. management is
not yet so developed as to fill countries with confidence that military operations
will be properly conducted. Finally, there is the absence of international
precedent. Lack of government interest suggests comfort with conducting
necessary operations as exercises in collective self-defense under the aegis of, but
not dependent on, the United Nations. States thus far have not been willing to
give up or limit their right of self-defense beyond what the U.N. Charter and
customary law already provide. In addition, different perspectives on such
international crises as Rwanda and Haiti suggest that the world has yet to accept
that peace is indivisible.
[Vol. 2:181
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As we look to the next fifty years, we can be sure of few signposts. World
government will likely not emerge. In the mid-1790s, Emmanuel Kant wrote
that states do not want to give up the freedom world government would require.
Accordingly, the best he could foresee was "a union of nations which maintains
itself, prevents wars, and steadily expands." This was the animating idea of the
League of Nations and it is the animating idea of the United Nations. Though
war often has brought new wealth to new quarters, a sure peace is the best
environment for pursuing the Charter's goal of improved living standards in
larger freedom.
CONCLUSION
The absence of Cold War certainties offers opportunities as well as
challenges. The opportunities are easy to state, but difficult to seize: they are the
same that existed in 1919, when the international landscape similarly was
transformed almost beyond recognition. The world confronts opportunities to
strengthen the institutions of peace and extend the rule of law in international
affairs.
On an occasion such as this, it would be appropriate to close by quoting
John Donne, reminding us all that no one is an island entire of itself. The
United Nations is based upon that insight. In the turbulent world of today, it is
equally, if not more appropriate, to end by recalling what we have accomplished
in bringing the Cold War to a successful end and the cost of that accomplish-
ment. In doing so, we shall remind ourselves that the outcome was not
preordained and the consequences of a different outcome likely would have been
most unpleasant. Thus, we need to heed the cautionary theme of the last volume
of Winston Churchill's history of the Second World War: "How the Great
Democracies Triumphed, and So Were Able to Resume the Follies Which Had
So Nearly Cost Them Their Life." We need to recognize and accept that
maintaining peace and freedom requires unceasing effort and vigilance.
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